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THE DANDY AND THE FOGY: THACKERAY AND 
THE AESTHETICS/ETHICS OF THE 
LITERARY PRAGMATIST 
BY ROBERT P. FLETCHER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As he recounts Becky Sharp's rise to respectability, the narrator of 
Vanity Fair pauses, as he does frequently, to redescribe "our" re- 
lation to his fair heroine: 
It is all vanity to be sure: but who will not own to liking a little 
of it? I should like to know what well-constituted mind, merely 
because it is transitory, dislikes roast beef? That is a vanity; but 
may every man who reads this, have a wholesome portion of it 
through life, I beg: ay, though my readers were five hundred 
thousand. Sit down, gentlemen, and fall to, with a good hearty 
appetite; the fat, the lean, the gravy, the horseradish asyou like 
it-don't spare it. Another glass of wine, Jones, my boy-a little 
bit of the Sunday side. Yes, let us eat our fill of the vain thing, 
and be thankful therefor. And let us make the best of Becky's 
aristocratic pleasures likewise-for these too, like all other mor- 
tal delights, were but transitory.' 
Thackeray creates in this passage a perspective that takes away as 
it gives a probationary sympathy to Becky's ambition, and to a pos- 
sible reader's response to it. Our desire for the ephemeral products 
of existence is first validated; we shouldn't feel guilty for liking 
roast beef. Thackeray's feel for the transitory nature of experience 
here yields not an abstemious despair, but an unapologetic relish 
for our "vain things." "Well-constituted minds" give due attention 
to the here and now. Yet the chummy exhortation isundercut by his 
admission in the last sentence that both our and Becky's pleasures 
are "but transitory," as if-even though he admits the persuasive 
force of roast beef-he would posit something less transitory than 
temporal existence. Thus he has his roast beef and eats it too; he 
celebrates Becky's actions while qualifying (by temporalizing) their 
success. This wry sympathy is tame, however, compared to the 
irony in the advice that we should "make the best of Becky's aris- 
tocratic pleasures," for here the narrator counsels us to consume 
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"Becky Sharp" as we do roast beef. The novel itself is offered as just 
one more of those vain things which are transitory, and by impli- 
cation our desire for more than a transitory performance is a vanity 
in itself. The perspective has suddenly doubled, and we get caught 
in the middle, implicated by our enjoyment of Becky when we 
thought our voyeurism was harmless reading. 
A couple of questions of interest for how we read Thackeray (and 
other literature) are involved in this short intrusion: how are the 
author's fascination with and valuing of temporal existence and his 
positing of something transcendent to it related? And of what good 
is a narrative so infused with irony? These questions of value (of 
experience and of literature) for a "well-constituted mind" hinge on 
Thackeray's concept of vanity, that word that pervades virtually all 
of his work. Depending on context, almost anything and everything 
presented in a Thackerayan novel is vain (or valueless): material 
products, words, beliefs, life, love. The last of these is sometimes 
raised into a transcendent value, but at the end of his (currently) 
most valued work, Vanity Fair, even it is qualified, its contingency 
made apparent in the ironic dampening of Dobbin's ardor 
for Amelia. 
And yet, for a novelist troubled by the emptiness of existence, 
Thackeray writes books abounding in its materials: turtle soup and 
good claret, polished boots and shiny buttons, well-turned calves 
and bare arms fill his novels with the upper-middle class culture of 
his day. Vain can also mean conceited, or puffed up (certainly Jos 
Sedley personifies this definition), and Thackeray is fascinated by 
those who are particularly full of themselves and of life. Philip 
Firmin, the hero of his last complete novel, is one of Thackeray's 
most potent swaggerers. If at his most serious, Thackeray despairs 
over the futility of human endeavor, he just as often celebrates the 
vitality of those who, like Becky Sharp, chase after "pleasures." 
Few novelists are more conscious than Thackeray of how both cul- 
ture and literature are forever being reconstituted through rede- 
scriptions-the existing sign is found to be empty and is remade 
into something to be proud of, at least temporarily. And no Victo- 
rian novelist is more conscious of his own part in this process. His 
status as ironist and his foothold in the canon derive from his rec- 
ognition of the paradox that is the subject of Barbara Herrnstein 
Smith's recent book: when we invest something with meaning and/ 
or value, the contingency of that investment subjects it to eventual 
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devaluation-whether it be the fashions we wear, the books we 
write and read, or the lives we live.2 
If his consciousness of the fragility of value doesn't lead him to 
abandon the thrills of the fair, it does, however, occasionally open 
him to utopian yearnings for something not subject to change. 
Thackeray's sentiment today loses him more readers than his irony, 
but rather than coming from a soft head (a common accusation from 
unappreciative critics), it arises out of his intellectual realization of 
the impermanence of life, coupled with an appreciation of the dis- 
tinctiveness of each life.3 Richard Rorty reads a Philip Larkin poem 
as an expression of the human need to find something in life both 
idiosyncratic and universal-of the desire to be both poet and 
philosopher.4 Thackeray communicates this same drive to create 
both the unique-whether as dandy or novelist-and the represen- 
tative. His irony, which undercuts every performance (even his 
own), and his sentiment, which treasures the human urge to per- 
form, are both elements of a temperament which I designate, after 
Rorty, as that belonging to the protopragmatist.5 Thackeray values 
human effort o act or to know or to believe, while he questions the 
value of individual acts, knowledge, and beliefs. As a consequence 
of this pragmatic temperament, Thackerayan narratives are a blend 
of inquiry and provisional assertion, heuristic in their project to 
reassess the significance of human action. This disposition of mind 
lies behind the theme of vanity and influences Thackeray's con- 
cepts of fiction, narrative, and the ethical function of literature. 
II. THACKERAY AS AN IRONIST 
One of the easiest ways into Thackeray's literary pragmatism is 
through irony, doubtless a critical path itself tangled by numerous 
remappings. When seen as a literary tool, it can be appropriated by 
writers with radically different philosophies. William Empson's so- 
called single irony merely requires the use of an incongruity in one 
standpoint to bolster another that the writer finds more attractive. 
The attempt to provide an example of this use of irony, however, 
might be tricky, as we would quite easily find a point of dispute in 
whether the writer really endorses the point of view left intact. This 
problem of where irony stops once it starts brings us to Empson's 
double irony, labeled variously by others as Romantic irony, unsta- 
ble irony, dialectic, or reflexivity.6 Here, rather than one viewpoint 
being permanently adopted in place of an earlier or more conven- 
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tional one, the writer retreats from each position, only conditionally 
accepting any view as a resting point. Every view is qualified, and 
every use of language is rhetorically marked as self-conscious. 
In all such theories, irony includes a self-consciousness about 
one's own language. When the thoroughgoing ironist sees a particu- 
lar use of language as not necessary but only possible, sees it is as 
subject to troping (through parody, for instance) as human life is 
itself to mutability, the ironist can bring an awareness of this shift 
in value to his or her own life. According to Rorty, the realization 
that contingency underwrites human culture allows the ironist to 
attempt his or her own self-creation through language. The ironist 
redescribes self and the world, and in so doing, creates a distinctive 
identity, the difference from all other "I's," the loss of which, Rorty 
claims, is what we fear when we contemplate death (CIS, 23). But 
the ironist also realizes the contingency of that proud act of inven- 
tion, and knowing it subject to change, holds it tentatively, until 
another act of redescribing makes it obsolete. Rorty's irony, then, is 
more philosophy than technique, or rather, the technique and phi- 
losophy are often found together. This description fits Thackeray 
both as critic and practicing novelist; coincident with his brilliance 
as literary parodist and ironist is a pragmatism that reenacts the 
conflicting desires to be unique and universal, of the moment and 
lasting. 
Drawn from his readings of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, 
Freud, William James, Donald Davidson, and others, Rorty's de- 
scription of the ironist is of one who conducts inquiry into previ- 
ously held notions of reality, and of self and others, through rede- 
scription. How we are like and unlike others is the ironist's constant 
object of discovery and reassessment. This figure itself seems to be 
a good model for understanding Thackeray's fascination with his 
culture's morality and modes of existence. In The Book of Snobs, 
Thackeray embodies the paradox of the individual seeking distance 
from a language (in this case, that of snobbery) to a point less open 
to questioning, and in the end reproducing the same language: 
It is a great mistake to judge of Snobs lightly, and think they exist 
among the lower classes merely. An immense percentage of 
Snobs, I believe, is to be found in every rank of this mortal ife. 
You must not judge hastily or vulgarly of Snobs: to do so shows 
that you are yourself a Snob. I myself have been taken for one. 
(Works, 6:305) 
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In fact, snobbery for Thackeray is related to irony in an important 
way. Both the ironist and the snob distance themselves from the 
language of the other; but snobs take their position (and its accom- 
panying language) as superior to that of the other, as somehow 
stable or permanently valuable (or more "realistic"), while ironists 
see their alternative life or language as just one more contingency. 
We might say snobs are ironists unaware that they are being ironic 
about one very much like themselves. And the slyly placed point of 
dispute in the quotation above is just how aware Mr. Snob is. 
Thackeray's willingness to explore and question "final 
vocabularies" (Rorty, CIS, 73)-those of his culture as well as his 
own-needs itself to be explored anew. I find evidence for this 
brand of philosophical irony (which pragmatists would argue en- 
lists under its banner such diverse figures as Emerson and 
Nietzsche, Wordsworth and Derrida) in Thackeray's novels and 
journalism.7 Rorty's statement that "since there is nothing beyond 
vocabularies which serves as a criterion of choice between them, 
criticism is a matter of looking on this picture and on that, not of 
comparing both pictures with the original" (CIS, 80) sounds like 
the basis for Thackeray's evaluative art criticism, in which he un- 
abashedly favors one picture over another, not because it captures 
an ideal or a truth, but because the clothes on the figures suit him 
and his culture better.8 On the other hand, in his travel books he 
provides a perspective on his own culture as well as the foreign 
one; the Fat Contributor is first an advocate for English ways but 
then the satirist of English tourists' habits-seemingly embodying, 
so to speak, Rorty's claim that "nothing can serve as a criticism of a 
person save another person, or of a culture save an alternative cul- 
ture-for persons and cultures are, for us, incarnated vocabularies" 
(CIS, 80).9 Thackeray embraces the relation between subjective 
voice speaking and the meaning found in the object, unlike-as 
Smith points out-critics in the early and mid-twentieth century 
(CV, 17-29). While the snob, the ironist, and the sentimentalist 
seem to usurp each other's position in Thackeray's mind, their vo- 
cabularies finally play against one another to remind him and us 
that they are each only a vocabulary. 
Of course snobs and ironists live in Vanity Fair. Thackeray's con- 
cept of vanity has its place in a philosophical tradition stretching 
from the utilitarians to the pragmatism formulated by Charles Sand- 
ers Peirce at the end of the nineteenth century and developed in 
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the twentieth by William James, John Dewey, and now Rorty. Com- 
mon to all are both the process by which old truths are overturned 
in favor of new ones and the attitude of inquiry engendered by that 
process. Thackeray's inquiries take the form of fictions interspersed 
with intrusive self-assessments which posit possible relations be- 
tween the fiction and the reader's own language, thus ironically 
exposing the latter as one description. An examination of Thacker- 
ay's irony, therefore, leads us to his concept of fiction and his con- 
cern with its uses. 
III. EXPLORING, EXPOSING, AND EXPLOITING THE POWER 
OF FICTION 
Modern philosophers and literary theorists engage the problem 
of truth and fiction (as well as the related one of reality and litera- 
ture) on a theoretical level. Thackeray, although not articulating 
their formulations, did anticipate in his narratives and criticism the 
concerns of those who ponder the connections between fiction and 
the world, and among fiction, our selves, and the values we define. 
In On the Margins of Discourse, Smith divides language use into 
fictive discourse and natural discourse in order to get at the former's 
distinctive features.'0 Unlike speech-act theorist John Searle, who 
opposes "real world talk" to "parasitic discourse" by designating 
nonfictional uses of language as "natural," she does not imply that 
nonfictional uses of language are of more value." Fictive discourse 
is no more artificial for Smith than other discourse; its ontological 
status is, if not the same, just as secure. But there is something 
distinctive about it. She cites children's ability at an early age to tell 
(and understand as fictions) imaginative stories, as well as Gregory 
Bateson's claim for the significance of the chimpanzee's ability to 
distinguish real aggression from fake aggression (or play).'2 
The way we respond to utterances (or texts) depends to a great 
extent on our classifications of them, based upon conventional 
markers. As Robert Newsom points out in his book A Likely Story, 
the deeply engrossed viewer of a scary movie has classified the 
experience of seeing a film as one of watching a fiction; this clas- 
sification makes available a second frame of reference which fore- 
stalls the necessity of the viewer getting up and running out of the 
theater when the monster on the screen stalks as if towards the 
audience.'3 Yet, as Woody Allen's The Purple Rose of Cairo so 
whimsically shows, people nonetheless can and do blur the 
"margin" between fictive text and real discourse. Smith points to 
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the effectiveness of modern advertising and the "sentimental" 
value of prefabricated greeting card verse to reveal how we some- 
times use and interpret fictive utterances as "natural" (OMD, 55- 
60). The conventions which allow us to interpret something as fic- 
tion are exploited in other nonfictive contexts. We learn from our 
lifelong experience with language when the conventions that char- 
acterize fictive discourse apply and when they don't, but there is 
always the potential for confusion, purposeful or otherwise. 
Thackeray as novelist and critic is fascinated by the problem of 
fiction, what constitutes it and how we use it. His parodies-both 
"Novels by Eminent Hands" and the many snippets in the novels, 
such as the beginning of the "Vauxhall" chapter of Vanity Fair- 
evidence his sensitivity to how we use language to form our un- 
derstanding of experiences. As Bateson argues that different 
"maps" can be applied to the same "territory" and thereby consti- 
tute different kinds of knowledge, so Thackeray shows that differ- 
ent "plots" (which includes stylistic variation) can be applied to the 
same "story" and thereby yield different fictions."4 He plays such 
stylized "language games" against one another, exaggerating the 
markers of Lever's or Disraeli's distinctive vocabularies, for in- 
stance, so as to eliminate the representational bond to reality each 
claims to possess. The conventions of such romances have for him 
the status of "prefabricated discourse," to use Smith's term; they 
are overused tools which-though they can stand out when exag- 
gerated in parody-can still be effective when used well. Thacker- 
ay's strenuous attacks on the Newgate Novel proceed from an am- 
bivalence about the ways in which Bulwer and others (Thackeray 
even classified Dickens among them) could adapt prefabricated 
forms of fiction (romance), complete with markers signaling they 
were meant to be interpreted as fiction, to subjects (crimes) com- 
monly described in a rhetoric conventionally taken to be "natural 
discourse" and thereby blur the margins between the two. He ob- 
jected to Bulwer and company, therefore, not only on account of the 
unnaturalness of describing criminals as heroes, but because he 
was acutely aware of the potential unnaturalness of all discourse. 
No vocabulary is more originally attached to reality than any other; 
each is merely a construct, a compelling fiction imposed by humans 
and competing with others quite as capable of describing a given 
reality if used well and read as natural. As Smith argues, there are 
no hard and fast rules for when and when not to read something as 
fiction, and we occasionally cross over from doing the one to the 
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other without being aware of the switch (OMD, 41-75). In Cath- 
erine, his own attempt to expose the fictionality of Newgate fic- 
tions, Thackeray encountered the difficulty of employing a conven- 
tional discourse that is marked as fictional without finding it as 
persuasive as reality. He began with parody, but (like Fielding in 
Joseph Andrews) found it difficult to carry out the exercise to novel 
length without creating a coherent orchestration of language which 
he found convincing himself. Thackeray appropriated the narrative 
formula but found his heroine more than formulaic: 
Your letter with compliments has just come to hand; it is very 
ingenious in you to find such beauties in Catherine which was a 
mistake all through-it was not made disgusting enough that is 
the fact, and the triumph of it would have been to make readers 
so horribly horrified as to cause them to give up or rather throw 
up the book and all of it's [sic] kind, whereas you see the author 
had a sneaking kindness for his heroine, and did not like to make 
her utterly worthless.'5 
Two years later Thackeray returned to this topic of how fictional 
convention can become part of our natural discourse. Barry Lyn- 
don, unlike Catherine and his own literary ancestor Fielding's 
Jonathan Wild, tells his own story. Despite his insistence on plain 
speaking, he frequently lapses into romance, sometimes unwit- 
tingly, sometimes quite consciously, as when he reflects on his 
challenge for his cousin's hand: 
"I'll have his blood, or he shall have mine; and this riband shall 
be found dyed in it. Yes! and if I kill him, I'll pin it on his breast, 
and then she may go take back her token." This I said because I 
was very much excited at the time, and because I had not read 
my novels and romantic plays for nothing.'6 
Although Barry can detect in retrospect the artificiality of his 
younger self's language, at other times he adopts a heroic idiom 
without being aware of its rhetorical nature, as, for instance, when 
he describes himself as a romantic gambler-gentleman: 
Is this not something like boldness? does this profession not 
require skill, and perseverance, and bravery? Four crowned 
heads looked on at the game, and an imperial princess, when I 
turned up the ace of hearts and made Paroli, burst into tears. No 
man on the European Continent held a higher position than Red- 
mond Barry then; and when the Duke of Courland lost, he was 
pleased to say that we had won nobly: and so we had, and spent 
nobly what we won. (BL, 130) 
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We enjoy the braggadocio at this point; we simultaneously laugh at 
Barry and participate in this fictional (in a double sense-perhaps 
"fictive fictional"?) life. Only later, when he terrorizes Lady Lyn- 
don into marrying him, are we made aware of the consequences 
that Barry's fictions about himself have for others, and of how our 
crediting those stories (as readers of Barry Lyndon) somehow im- 
plicates us in their effectiveness. When he enters Lady Lyndon's 
world as her suitor, Barry poses as the gothic villain-"Terror, be 
sure of that," he tells us, "is not a bad ingredient of love" (218)- 
and succeeds in instilling a fear and fascination in his object. 
Through Barry's tireless efforts, this initial contact becomes a "story 
of her ladyship's passionate attachment for me," and our PR wizard 
is not slow "in profiting by these rumours" (228). He continues his 
progress: 
Every one thought I was well with the widowed countess, 
though no one could show that I said so. But there is a way of 
proving a thing even while you contradict it, and I used to laugh 
and joke so a propos that all men began to wish me joy of my 
great fortune, and look up to me as the affianced husband of the 
greatest heiress in the kingdom. The papers took up the matter. 
(228) 
Thackeray makes his scoundrel a master at manipulating the public 
voice of gossip, because the novelist understands how much of 
personal belief is made up of such culturally shared fictions. If 
Barry can convince the world of this "love story" he can persuade 
Lady Lyndon as well that "Fate works with agents, great and small; 
and by means over which they have no control the destinies of men 
and women are accomplished" (231). She does eventually succumb 
to Barry's artfully constructed "fate" and marries him. Throughout 
the novel, "fate," "luck," and "fortune" serve the failed Barry's 
own purposes as comforting fictions to explain away his imprisoned 
end. The novel is largely about belief in fictions: Barry's own, Lady 
Lyndon's, and most importantly the reader's belief in Barry Lyn- 
don. Thackeray deliberately juggles the moments when we have to 
credit some of what Barry says with those when we know he is 
lying, and even adds in a third level of "editor" complete with 
interpretive tastes for "poetical justice [which] overtakes the daring 
and selfish hero" (234), all to show us the temptation we have when 
reading to forget the fictionality of the discourse, or of such things 
as "poetical justice." The novel itself succeeds in "proving a thing 
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even while [it] contradictis] it" by getting us to reflexively credit 
(as a fiction) a fictional iar's life. 
Thackeray focuses so much of his attention on Barry Lyndon and 
other scoundrels because of their ability to manipulate the conven- 
tions governing discursive transactions in an amusing (albeit insid- 
ious) way. The dangerous liar is he who not only violates the "basic 
assumption of the linguistic marketplace" that referents are implied 
by a verbal or textual event and are to be inferred "in accord with 
the relevant rules and conventions" (Smith, OMD, 100), but keeps 
that event coherent and, above all, interesting as well. In other 
words he is the potential fiction writer. If Barry Lyndon fails at 
sustaining a coherent narrative (and from the first sentence of the 
novel Thackeray makes a point of providing plenty of room for in- 
terpretive inferences that contradict Barry's own), he succeeds in mak- 
ing his story interesting, inmaking himself an interesting character. 
Thackeray and other writers who employ such unreliable narra- 
tors understand and exploit the rules of a language game which 
dictate that 
a natural utterance [or text] constitutes, for the listener, not only 
an invitation and provocation, but ultimately an obligation, to 
respond to the speaker. When we "listen" to someone, as distin- 
guished from merely noticing or overhearing what he says-in 
other words, when we identify ourselves as his audience-we 
implicitly agree to make ourselves available to that speaker as 
the instrument ofhis interests. We agree not only to hear but to 
heed his promises, excuses, questions, and commands-and also, 
of course, his assertions. Most simply, but most significantly, we 
agree to understand what he means, that is, to infer the motives 
and circumstances that occasioned his utterance. (Smith, OMD, 
101-2) 
When we "listen" to a narrative we agree, at least initially, to accept 
what the narrator presents to us as true, until we detect a violation 
of the good faith needed to play the game. Even then we have to 
credit some of what we are told-or stop playing the game with this 
speaker (or writer), or play our own game-as is often the case with 
the speaker-less (presence-less) text. What happens, Thackeray 
seems to be asking in Barry Lyndon, when we know the rules are 
being transgressed without being suspended (Barry claims to be an 
autobiographer not a fiction writer), and we find the discourse in- 
teresting nonetheless? Are we then believing a fiction to be true? 
Can we always, while we are enjoying ourselves with the story, 
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keep the fictive and natural utterances clearly distinguished? And 
what are the consequences of such a play with the conventions of 
discourse? Thackeray's project is to educate his readers in their 
habits of reading and of belief. Probability and credulity are always 
at issue for Thackeray, not only in his criticism of others, but in his 
own novels as well. He seems-as a novelist-to be more interested 
in how we read and believe than in whether particular beliefs are 
true. His protopragmatism evidences itself in this preoccupation 
with how we know and its consequences for how we live. 
IV. SKEPTICISM AND BELIEF; VANITY AND VALUE 
The interest in fiction's sway with readers that I have been trac- 
ing in the last section is related to Thackeray's own struggles with 
skepticism and belief. His theological doubts instill an episte- 
mological uncertainty, or vice versa. Taken together these condi- 
tions both make possible the fictions he writes and help determine 
his eventual difficulty with writing fiction at all. 
Gordon Ray has documented Thackeray's recurring struggles 
with skepticism, first under the influence of Edward Fitzgerald, 
and later as he took in the intellectual currents of mid-century.17 
Ray cites extensively chapter 61 of Pendennis, "The Way of the 
World," wherein the dialectic between the skeptical, worldly Pen 
and the resolute, dutiful George Warrington does indeed reflect the 
author's own conflict between doubt and certainty. The cynical Pen 
argues that absolute faith in one's own voice breeds dogmatism and 
persecution; he cites historical examples to support his position. So 
far he is in the right. Even Warrington and the narrator admire the 
young dandy's tolerance of human imperfection and rejection of 
cant. But Pen uses these realizations to justify an indifference to all 
human endeavor and all morality, and this is where he trips up. 
Thackeray's will to believe is embodied in the fogy Warrington, 
who insists that the struggle itself, "the protest" against the impo- 
tence of skepticism, is all. To Pen's "sneering acquiescence in the 
world as it is; or if you like so to call it, . . . belief qualified with 
scorn in all things extant" (Works, 2:614-15) is opposed War- 
rington's sense of duty. In this tension between belief and doubt is 
Thackeray's peculiar appreciation of fiction born, for in the incon- 
gruity of this desire to believe with an ironic distance from forms of 
belief we find an important element in our understanding of fictive 
discourse, the mind's simultaneous use of two frames of reference, 
the ability to believe while not believing. Thackeray's tempera- 
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ment, exemplified by this coincidence of skepticism and the will to 
believe, suits him to his chosen task of uncovering vanity, that 
double-sided coin of conceit and emptiness, which shows us how 
human culture can be both legal tender and counterfeit at the same 
time. 
If vanity allows Thackeray to express his skeptic side, it also 
permits him to celebrate the attempt to believe, the attempt to find 
value. To be self-consciously vain of something is to be cognizant of 
overvaluing the item even while enjoying it. In this sense of vanity 
Thackeray himself recognizes what Smith calls the "contingencies 
of value." Although we always want to believe in things, people, 
ideas, and words, without qualification, we find our understanding 
of each depends upon particular contexts and chance events, and 
must be kept current through revision. 
Belief, then, becomes for Thackeray an ideal that is never fully 
realized. His temperament of mind favors habits of inquiry once 
again akin to those of pragmatism. He had been tutored at Cam- 
bridge by William Whewell, who lectured on connections between 
science and morality and was writing his History of the Inductive 
Sciences while Thackeray attended, and later in life, as a moderate 
liberal, he admired science's and society's advances. I believe a 
healthy skepticism, which Richard Poirier has deemed a prerequi- 
site to "the deed of writing," finds its expression in Thackeray's 
work in the significant role that discovery and inquiry play in his 
novels.'8 His chatty narrators may endorse particular values (which 
we may or may not agree with as we read him now), but they more 
importantly rehearse the act of valuing, because Thackeray sees 
how we are capable of changing the nature of things we experience 
(for ourselves) when we redescribe them: 
A word of kindness or acknowledgment, or a single glance of 
approbation, might have changed Esmond's opinion of the great 
man; and instead of a satire, which his pen cannot help writing, 
who knows but that the humble historian might have taken the 
other side of panegyric? We have but to change the point of view, 
and the greatest action looks mean; as we turn the perspective- 
glass, and a giant appears a pigmy. You may describe, but who 
can tell whether your sight is clear or not, or your means of 
information accurate? (Works, 7:222) 
Because of this dialogic element in Thackeray's work, I pair as 
analogous the concepts of skepticism and vanity, and belief and 
value (sentimental or otherwise). When we value something we 
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often believe in it quite fervently (as Thackeray shows in a pathetic 
character like Old Osborne). Thackeray's skepticism is best de- 
scribed by the term vanity because the latter hints at the vague 
notion of something beyond the contingent which instills him with 
his sentimental melancholy. Perhaps this frame of mind derives 
from his remarkable sense of the contingency of things past. In a 
"Roundabout" essay on a fragment by Charlotte Bront&, he specu- 
lates about the text (and by implication about aesthetic texts in 
general): "If the Has Been, why not the Might Have Been?" 
(Works, 12:187). Not only might things have been different, they 
"Might Have Been" represented differently, and these two, Thack- 
eray realizes-through his inquiries into probability in narrative- 
can be very nearly the same. 
Once philosophers realize (as Thackeray does) that particular val- 
ues are possibilities but not necessities, they begin to downplay 
abstract moral law in favor of individual narratives-the moral func- 
tion of which depends on such a relativistic ethics. Rorty has de- 
scribed narrative's central role in exploring the value of particular 
ethical paradigms-in fact, he calls the history of intellectual and 
moral progress "a history of increasingly useful metaphors" (CIS, 
9). This role is certainly the one Thackeray saw good fictional nar- 
ratives playing in his own society. However, fictions which either 
attempt to hide their fictionality or propose too easily a 
"transcendent" or "romantic" truth come under his severest scru- 
tiny. His own voice, on the other hand, is always clearly that of an 
individual relating the events of his experience: that is, always 
clearly in a rhetorical situation complete with all the hazards of 
argument and deception. Thackeray's narratives depend heavily on 
a discernible scaffold of hypothesis and inference for their persua- 
siveness, and their goal is discovery of new ways of talking about 
reality, and new descriptions of it that encompass older ones. The 
ironist specializes in redescribing reality in partially neologistic 
jargon (Rorty, CIS, 78); Thackeray's attempts to redefine such 
things as snobbery, worldly success, and the gentleman are signs of 
his interest in using narrative as heuristic.'9 He realizes there are 
no values which are not contingent and no vocabularies which are 
final. Perhaps the most interesting result, for his readers, of his 
doubts and desire to believe is the effect his uncertainty has on the 
form of his novels. Uncertain of himself as well as others, Thack- 
eray writes narrative which involves a great deal of speculation, 
playful and serious at once. 
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V. THACKERAYAN NARRATIVE AS COGNITIVE PLAY 
Reading Thackeray's novels as representations of our need to 
reassess and revise cognitive activity and its accompanying moral 
judgements allows us to appreciate certain distinctive features of 
Thackeray's art, while not denying that many of his individual as- 
sessments and judgements are not ours. Thackeray can still make us 
aware of the "independent charms of epistemic activity" (Smith, 
OMD, 117). In life we are mainly concerned with cognitive ends 
which are rewarded by the everyday world. In art we are made 
aware of cognitive activities-how we know what we know-and 
Thackeray's narratives reward readers for taking their cues to ex- 
amine how they use cultural and narrative conventions to form their 
worlds. On the other hand, Thackeray's unrevised racial views as, 
for instance, in the character of Woolcomb in Philip, are offensive to 
us (and undoubtedly have lost him many readers). His individual 
assessments stand up less well than his interest in assessing. But 
even in that novel, as Alexander Welsh has argued (Welsh, Thack- 
eray), we can find valuable Thackeray's use of fiction for heuristic 
purposes. 
I think it is worth pursuing the suggestion Welsh has made that 
Thackerayan narrative is distinctive for its predominantly specula- 
tive tenor. According to Rorty, narrative is one of the pragmatist's 
primary tools for helping us see and revise our intellectual habits 
(CIS, vxi). Fictional narrative helps us invent new vocabularies, 
since-as we have seen-its places of intersection with our present 
vocabulary help loosen the latter's hold on our knowledge of the 
world. Smith sees fictional narratives as examples of "cognitive 
play," places where we test out new descriptions of the world and 
of our place in it with relatively few consequences (when, that is, 
we can clearly keep distinguished the "margins"). These aesthetic 
toys and ethical tools allow us to grasp the "structural relations" 
(Smith, OMD, 117) of our world and modify them, and perhaps 
consequently modify the world outside us. In order to so work and 
allow us to learn, cognitive activity must be 
characterized by, among other things, a combination-either a
balance or a particular atio-of novelty and familiarity, repeti- 
tion and variation, conformity and disparity, redundancy and in- 
formation. Learning is most graciously invited by a situation that 
appears to some extent unknown but that promises knowability. 
(Smith, OMD, 118) 
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It is the testing of such patterns that Thackeray's novels rehearse. 
And so he blends the old vocabularies of his world with hypotheses 
about how they relate to one another. 
One of Thackeray's most direct discussions of this stitching to- 
gether of observation and inference occurs in an intrusion by Pen- 
dennis into his narrative of the Newcome family. According to this 
theory, the novelist "puts this and that together: from the footprint 
finds the foot; from the foot, the brute who trod upon it" (Works, 
8:491). The entire passage compares the novelist's job to the pale- 
ontologist's, describing the former as one who, like Professor Agas- 
siz, speculates from a "fragment of a bone" (Works, 8:491). The 
fragment, the historical evidence, in the novelist's case consists of 
language, the vocabularies and conventions of culture, both past 
and present. But much must be expanded upon, revised, and thus 
discovered. Thackeray's blends of commentary and action in his 
narratives work like the scientist's hypothesis and experiment. The 
narrator proposes something as happening, or as a past happening, 
or even as a possible happening, and then interprets it for us, pro- 
posing meanings for it and possibly even applying the meanings to 
his readers' lives. Smith writes of our "epistemic fixation" (OMD, 
117), our hunger for information, knowledge, and interpretations 
for us in turn to interpret. Thackeray's narrators enact that process- 
ing. The delight is in watching this acute mind tracing the patterns 
and making us aware of our own tracings. 
One of the most fruitful places to go exploring for this cognitive 
activity is Chapter 64 of Vanity Fair, aptly labeled "A Vagabond 
Chapter."20 As that title suggests, it seems indeed wandering, no- 
madic, as it follows the fortunes of Becky, the novel's irrepressible 
vagabond, who strays ever more after Rawdon leaves her. We catch 
up with her in this chapter by following her retreat to the Continent 
and her subsequent ways of life. Filled with ambiguities and eva- 
sions about just what Becky does and does not do, how others do or 
do not act towards her, and why they might or might not have done 
so, it resists our desire to rest from interpretation. For every piece 
of evidence of Becky's guilt there is an extenuating circumstance, a 
sympathetic reading of the incident, or a complete displacement of 
responsibility. Becky is depicted as more acted upon than acting in 
her "abattement and degradation" (625). The snobbish Lady Sling- 
stones who hound her are accompanied by such wolves as the lech- 
erous Grinstone who "showed his teeth and laughed in her face 
with a familiarity that was not pleasant" (627). The point of view 
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wanders in the chapter from a distanced perspective on "poor little 
Becky" (627) to "our little wanderer's" (632) own thoughts, endear- 
ingly presented, at George Osborne's grave, until we are indirectly 
given her genuine anxiety upon encountering Lord Steyne and 
being rejected. Throughout the chapter, Thackeray has manipu- 
lated us through vocabulary and point of view to keep us off balance 
as to just how much we are to sympathize with Becky. 
The chapter starts off very clearly with the distinction between 
"the moral world" and "vice" (624), even though it teases us with 
the distinction between appearance and reality in the elaborate 
description of Becky as siren. The narrator obviously sets out to 
satirize the "truly-refined English or American female" who 
doesn't want vice represented. But in that complaint over censor- 
ship a comfortable dichotomy between appearance and reality, and 
moral and immoral, is itself set up for the purpose of knocking it 
down. Supposedly we have the decorous (unreal) world of novels 
and the (real) world of vice, personified by Becky, in her role of 
mermaid. But as we have seen, the rest of the chapter under- 
mines-through its wavering point of view, conflicting scenes, and 
ambiguous images-that very category of vice. Even the central 
metaphor contributes to this collapsing of the dichotomy, though it 
seems to support the absolute morality of good and bad, woman and 
demon. The siren is supposedly half woman, half fish, and the 
mocking opening paragraph warns us against following the crea- 
tures into "their native element," where they "are about no good, 
... revelling and feasting on their wretched pickled victims" (625). 
But as we have seen, within two pages Becky is herself presented 
as victim, subject to the teeth of other predators. The metaphor of 
siren is retained, however, with very interesting results. As she is 
chased from place to place and made more and more lonely through 
this persecution, she is presented as "perched upon the French 
coast" (626); she shares "in sea-bathing" and takes walks "upon the 
jetty" (627), attracts temporary companions with "the sweetness of 
her singing" (629) and her "graces and fascinations" (630-31). 
Thackeray has exploited a different interpretation of the siren fig- 
ure as one of banishment and loneliness to put in question his own 
earlier use of it. To discredit completely the alignment of his pro- 
jected readers with good and the sirens with bad, he associates 
Becky with Mrs. Hook Eagles, "a woman without a blemish in her 
character" who makes Becky's acquaintance "at sea, where they 
were swimming together" (630). Thus the harpy and the siren be- 
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come momentarily bosom companions (surely Thackeray is here 
drawing from the alternative tradition of depicting sirens as half 
bird, not fish), and the language not only of novels, but of morality 
is criticized. 
The chapter, then, is truly vagabond, not only in its interest in 
Becky's leading an unsettled, irregular, or disreputable life, but in 
its own roving, straying, narration, its point of view seemingly not 
subject to control or restraint. At its beginning we are presented 
with a clear distinction between surface and depth, decorum and 
vice; after its explorations of those oppositions we are left with an 
opaque verbal and narrative surface, its depth (that is, the "truth" 
about Becky) imperceptible. The play of the narrative, which is 
dominated by speculative qualifiers like "perhaps" and "I don't 
think" and "very likely," comes up with no definite answers to the 
question of "her history [which] was after all a mystery" (629), but 
it does discover (and discredit) the conventions of a couple of lan- 
guage games. Throughout Thackeray's work we can find such play 
with possible meanings, possible responses, and the possible 
worlds which are implied by both. 
There are several ramifications (for other narratives as well as 
Thackeray's) of this use of fiction for cognitive play, one of which is 
the improvisational form that such narratives employ. Part of 
Thackeray's genius is his ability to develop his characters and plots 
as his narrative discoveries change them. Thus, the narrator's atti- 
tude toward Amelia Sedley develops as she does, from admiration 
for a typical heroine (devoted and passive) to impatience with an 
obsessive and manipulative woman. He can also suddenly find 
some interesting qualities in Rawdon Crawley, after he (and we) 
had him pegged as a stupid bully. The figure of the dandy can 
signify independence (in Arthur Pendennis) or utter dependence 
on society (in the Major), depending on context. At the end of The 
Newcomes, like Scott at the end of Old Mortality, Thackeray even 
leaves the plot open-anticipating the "modern" phenomenon of 
"open" texts-by suggesting that the picture we might have of the 
hero and heroine married is only wishful thinking. He thus empha- 
sizes both how readers participate in creating the novel by bringing 
their common vocabulary of novelistic conventions to the text and 
how his dissatisfaction with conventional forms (of literature and 
knowledge) gives him a certain daring independence with which to 
play the game. Finally, in Henry Esmond, according to Ray, Thack- 
eray's most planned novel, his hero's melancholy sense of change 
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and nostalgia for the past (represented by the faithful woman, 
Rachel Esmond) make one of the very subjects of the novel the 
extent to which chance and improvisation make up our (or at least, 
according to this passage, men's) experience: 
What is the meaning of fidelity in love, and whence the birth of 
it? 'Tis a state of mind that men fall into, and depending on the 
man rather than the woman. We love being in love, that's the 
truth on't. If we had not met Joan, we should have met Kate, and 
adored her. We know our mistresses are no better than many 
other women, nor no prettier, nor no wiser, nor no wittier. 'Tis 
not for these reasons we love a woman, or for any special quality 
or charm I know of; we might as well demand that a lady should 
be the tallest woman in the world, like the Shropshire giantess, 
as that she should be a paragon in any other character, before we 
began to love her. (Works, 7:272-73) 
Another consequence of both Thackeray's role as ironist and his 
use of narrative for cognitive play is his understanding of the ethical 
import of fiction. Since he sees vocabularies not as pictures of the 
world but as tools for discovery (and for deception), and since he 
reenacts in his fiction the revisions we constantly make, he is sen- 
sitive to the social conflicts that occur when differing vocabularies 
(complete with their differing values) meet. 
VI. THACKERAY'S AESTHETIC AND ETHICAL PRAGMATISM 
To say that it is impossible not to be sometimes a snob is to 
acknowledge in a wonderfully provocative way how we must some- 
times inscribe limits to irony even if we consider ourselves com- 
plete ironists. We must credit some uses of language at least some 
of the time. We have to interpret ourselves and others and texts, 
even if we realize at the same time the inevitable limitations of 
those readings; we cannot perpetually expect a better reading and 
still function in our social worlds. If the snob tries to play up his 
claims and the claims of those he values to truth, the ironist works 
against this exclusivity, to subvert it in favor of a general leveling, 
an understanding of the contingency of every vocabulary. Hence, as 
Rorty says, the ironist, who questions the necessary existence of a 
permanent moral order, has always seemed hostile to human soli- 
darity (CIS, xv). This subversive enterprise is also the topic of 
Harold Bloom's "agonistic" theory of literature and Thackeray's 
declaration in The English Humourists: "Yesterday's preacher be- 
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comes the text for today's sermon" (Works, 7:424).21 The recogni- 
tion of his own snobbery, however, signifies Thackeray's awareness 
that the ironic process does not go on forever in any individual 
mind; the revolution (and semiosis) must come to a place of rest at 
least for a while. It is in this conflict between the status quo and the 
radical (past meanings and the interpretive impulse, in the analo- 
gous terms from hermeneutics) that literature exists for Thackeray. 
Along with the ironist's subversiveness Thackeray displays his dis- 
trust of revolutionary zeal. Despite the implications of Barbara Har- 
dy's excellent book The Exposure of Luxury: Radical Themes in 
Thackeray, I find him more a pragmatist than a radical, at least 
philosophically.22 Realizing the contingency of all vocabularies, he 
was both bemused and deeply troubled by the competitiveness of 
existence. 
In the pair of dandies, Arthur and Major Pendennis, we see how 
a cultural entity could signify something valuable at one moment 
and vain the next. This seemingly cavalier method of using the 
figure to mean different hings in different contexts, what we might 
call being the novelist-as-dandy, is another example of the ironist in 
Thackeray. He shows how circumstance helps determine meaning 
and value by adding one significant variable, age, to the club man, 
the Major, thereby changing his significance. This role of the nov- 
elist-as-dandy captures the bubble-bursting, mocking function of 
redescription. The young dandy stands as individual, independent 
of the social conventions of family and work, and, in the metaphors 
of Thackeray's universe, as the figure of self-creation. His waist- 
coats and gloves are signs from this private vocabulary, which is 
analogous to innumerable other such vocabularies we ourselves 
form. But occurring with regularity in Thackeray's discourse is the 
competing public vocabulary of George Warrington, or the fogy, or 
the preacher, whose earnestness quite frequently displaces the 
puppet-master's irony. Both these vocabularies, which occasion a 
doubleness itself an irony, are crucial for forming Thackeray's 
sense of psychic struggles in individual selves, in the literature 
they write and read, and in society. With such conflicting voices as 
part of his own make-up, Thackeray seems to appreciate how com- 
pletely the self is formed by competing vocabularies. As his use of 
the dandy indicates, he admires the ability (while also being wary 
of it) of those who consciously re-create themselves (through rec- 
reation and play). The dandy has and exercises choice, though it is 
a choice limited by the contingencies that have formed his past. 
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The voice of the preacher, on the other hand, employs the vo- 
cabulary not of self-creation, but of self-transcendence. When he 
preaches vanity, the fogy is emphasizing the contingency of the self 
created, and expressing the hope (at times seemingly vain in itself) 
that there is something not subject to such contextual determina- 
tion. As I pointed out at the beginning of this essay, Thackeray fails 
eventually to find anything immune to devaluation and realizes it. 
He finds that all of life cannot be held in a single language; its 
contradictions demand compromise. At times, this realization in- 
vigorates him, while at others it defeats him. 
This awareness of struggle instills his theory and practice of fic- 
tion with a slant toward ethical inquiry that is the final product of 
his own inquiries. Since the snob uses language as a tool-or a 
weapon, really-to exclude others, the exposure of the snob comes 
about through an ironic perspective on his language. But of course 
the catch-22 is that to call someone a snob is to be a snob, to use that 
same language of exclusion against him. The result for Thackeray is 
that the examination of the languages of snobbery (of value) be- 
comes a fixation, the only ethical role literature can play well. It 
cannot, according to Thackeray's practice of it, safeguard us from 
valueless enterprises and thoughts-to think that it can is to be a 
literary snob. The snob's comfort in judging others comes from his 
ability to hold that person off at a distance and thereby turn him into 
a thing for ridicule. The snob can voyeuristically enjoy the 
"meanness" of others, as Mr. Snob enjoys the Ponto family. Thack- 
eray's play is to turn the language of snobbery-which reifies the 
other-reflexively back upon himself and us. To objectify someone, 
to suspend the rules of how to respond to, or "listen to" (in Smith's 
words), a person, is to be a snob. Thackeray forces his readers to 
examine their language and their actions, to see how like the other's 
they are. This inquiry into his society's (and our) ethical vocabu- 
laries is the main subject of the Thackerayan novel. To see how the 
old preacher is turned into text by the next one, how the father is 
revised by the son, is to see how we have arrived where we are, and 
where we will wind up when we in turn are redescribed. This sort 
of epistemic activity is Thackeray's only ethical value for narrative. 
But, like Patricia Meyer Spacks, Thackeray also asks whether we 
can ever have "narrative without ethics."23 And like her, he con- 
cludes that reading and writing fictions "heightens ethical self- 
consciousness" (Spacks, 185). For Thackeray, fictional narratives 
imitate not so much an outer reality, but the cognitive activity of 
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human beings, the "texture of ethical life" (Spacks, 186; emphasis 
added). 
Smith describes the different language uses in society and liter- 
ature (labelled as natural and fictive discourse) in terms of the 
metaphors of linguistic marketplace and linguistic playground 
(OMD, 119). In society language is a tool of exchange; we give and 
receive real or bogus information for immediate practical ends. Lit- 
erature is the playground where we can try on vocabularies, see 
how they are different from our old ones, see if they fit us, with 
relatively few consequences (other than the knowledge of the na- 
ture of vocabularies gained in the process), because the rules gov- 
erning reactions to linguistic acts are suspended in this "Fable- 
land," to use Thackeray's name for it. The pair of metaphors en- 
compasses both the competitive and playful sides of rhetorical 
practice, and the satisfactions of both. Thackeray's use of Bunyan's 
place of business, Vanity Fair, in its turn, entails both of Smith's 
terms. For a fair involves both the business of the marketplace and 
the games of the playground, just as Thackeray's theory and prac- 
tice of fiction realizes both the hazards and satisfactions of exis- 
tence in a world of competing descriptions. 
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